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Abstract Nicholas Vrousalis has aimed to recast an old objection to the will theory of
rights by focusing on Hillel Steiner’s version of that theory. He has argued that Will
Theory must either be insensitive to the (values of the) lives of the unempowerable, or be
incomplete, because it has no argumentative resources within its conceptual apparatus to
ascribe or justify restrictions on the amount of discretion exercised by legal officials. I
show that both charges are problematic. They rely on some of Steiner’s inferences which
are simply unjustified because they are based on misinterpretations of the logic of
Hohfeld’s terminology. The problem for Vrousalis is that his critique takes for granted
some of these flawed arguments. The critique is also misdirected to the extent that it
assumes that the problems with Steiner’s theory affect Will Theory in general.
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Introduction
In a Comment published in this journal, Nicholas Vrousalis (2010) recasts an old
objection against the Will Theory of rights: the complaint that Will Theory is too
narrow—that it cannot account for many of the items that we commonly identify as
‘rights’. Vrousalis’s principal target is Hillel Steiner’s recent defence of Will Theory.1
In itself, there is nothing objectionable about this: Steiner’s book An Essay on Rights
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1 The abstract also mentions Nigel Simmonds’ defence, but for reasons that will become obvious
Vrasoulias’ objections cannot be taken to apply to Simmonds’s version.
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(1994) is an intellectual tour de force and his defence of the Will Theory a formidable
contribution to the debate, so it certainly deserves scrutiny. However, criticizing
Steiner’s version is one thing; criticizing Will Theory in general is quite another. One
cannot simply assume, as Vrousalis seems to do, that the latter is entailed by the
former, unless one has good reasons for believing that other versions of Will Theory
share the relevant properties. My first aim in this response is to show that this is not the
case. Will Theory is in fact more diverse than Vrousalis takes it to be: other versions of
the account are not susceptible to the criticism offered against Steiner. Consequently,
the critique merely highlights a problem with Steiner’s argument rather than the Will
Theory.
Vrousalis poses a dilemma for Hillel Steiner’s account with the aim of showing
that the Will Theory is either insensitive, in that it does not and cannot regard the
lives of the unempowerable as meriting direct normative considerations, or else
must be incomplete, in that it is unable to provide grounds for our duties to the
unempowerable.2 However, both propositions (which are supposed to constitute the
horns of the dilemma) are problematic. The former is in fact straightforwardly
flawed. It relies on the acceptance of some of Steiner’s mistaken claims concerning
the logic of Hohfeld’s typology of rights, which has provided the terminology in
which much of the debate between the Will Theory and the Interest Theory is cast.
My second aim, then, will be to show that Vrousalis gives Steiner too much credit.
The problem with this is that these conceptual errors affect Vrousalis’s critique as
well, since it relies on claims that are plainly mistaken.
In discussing the other horn, I shall distinguish between two different senses of
‘incompleteness’. The traditional indictment that Will Theory is incomplete relies on
an assumption that is rarely explicitly stated, but that often seems to be taken for granted
in contemporary discussions regarding the nature of rights—i.e. that the principal test
for a theory of the nature of rights is its ability to accommodate most of the normative
incidents that we would ordinarily identify as ‘rights’. Few people would be willing to
defend the thesis that extensional adequacy (as we may call it) is the only relevant
criterion in judging the merit of an account of rights. Yet recent debates between
adherents of the Will Theory and the Interest Theory have been dominated by attempts
to establish that one theory does a better job in accounting for our classificatory
judgments than the alternative. Thus one might easily be tempted to think that it is taken
to be the principal measure for evaluating a theory of rights. Once the assumption is
identified as such, the charge of incompleteness will immediately lose some of its
apparent force. My goal here will not be so much to discredit the significance of
extensional adequacy. I will simply suggest that the charge of incompleteness is much
less of an embarrassment to the Will Theory than it is made out to be.
The sense of ‘incompleteness’ that Vrousalis finds in Steiner’s theory, however, is
of a different nature. It is connected to an assumption which he dubs the ‘correlativity
axiom’3—the idea that for any legal duty there must be someone who holds a
2 This formulations of the horns of the dilemma leaves some room for different interpretations as to their
content, but pursuing them would lead us too far astray.
3 Vrousalis’s explanation of the axiom is misleading: Steiner’s unfortunate use of terminology has led
him to identify it with Hohfeld’s notion of correlativity. But correlativity as used by Hohfeld is best
understood as stipulative equivalence of terms. It is consistent with ’correlativity’ so understood to accept
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correlative right. Steiner doesn’t, to my knowledge, explicitly defend this thesis. But it
can perhaps be inferred from one of his claims regarding criminal law duties. This
defence, however, also rests on a misunderstanding of the logic of Hohfeldian terms.
The problem here is that, even if we accept some appropriately revised version of
Steiner’s correlativity thesis, we will not arrive at the position that Vrousalis needs in
order to sustain the claim that Will Theory is incomplete in this second sense.
Consequently, my conclusion will be that there is no dilemma. Once we get the
logic of rights straight, each of the supposed horns of the dilemma dissipates.
The twentieth-century debate between Will- and Interest Theory took off with
Hart’s famous critique of Bentham’s Interest Theory. Hart regarded the idea of an
individual’s control over someone’s duty as central to the concept of a right, ‘so that in
the area of conduct covered by the duty the individual who has the right is a small-scale
sovereign to whom the duty is owed’ (Hart 1982, p. 183). There was no doubt in Hart’s
mind that this account did not exhaust the way we invoke the notion of—even legal—
rights (Hart 1982, pp. 188–93). Nor does Steiner think that the Will Theory
accommodates all of the ways in which the notion of ‘a right’ is commonly invoked.
‘Theories of rights don’t come cheap’, Steiner wrote. Accepting either Will Theory
or Interest Theory involves paying a price ‘in the currency of counter-intuitiveness’
(Steiner 1998, p. 298). Whether and to what extent we should be willing to pay such a
price is of course open for debate. But Vrousalis intends to show that Will Theory
carries a price-tag that will discourage most of us from endorsing it.
In order to show this, he asks us to consider duties some of us might have
regarding the unempowerable. Consider M, a severely mentally disabled person in
need of medical treatment. Will theorists must deny M either the ability to have
rights or (minimally) the ability to exercise them. Steiner nonetheless thinks that the
duties—say, of doctors—to provide treatment are correlative to rights, only in this
case the rights are not held by the persons who stand to benefit from the exercise of
the doctor’s duties. Rather, we must locate these rights in state officials who have
powers to enforce or waive those duties (Steiner 1998, p. 261). The dilemma
appears, according to Vrousalis, when we ask whether these officials have a duty to
see to it that the doctors treat the disabled person. Steiner had argued that these
officials must lack such a duty, because it would contradict what we already
assumed—that they have a power to control the first-order duties of the doctors. If
Will Theory denies that these officials have such duties, then—Vrousalis argues—it
is guilty of insensitivity to the needs and interests of M, for it will put some
government officials in a position in which they can waive doctors’ duties
ad libitum. He insists that there is in fact a strong case for thinking that officials
have a duty to demand that doctors carry out their duties. ‘But there is nothing
within the will theory’s conceptual armoury that warrants or justifies ascription of
this duty’ (Steiner 1998, p. 419). Hence Will Theory is not ‘conceptually self-
subsistent’ and is thus incomplete.
Footnote 3 continued
that some duties are not directed (‘duties to someone’) and therefore not correlative. The correlativity that
Vrousalis assumes that Steiner defends is a substantive thesis which holds that for any legal duty we can
find a correlative (Will Theory-) right. Simmonds (1998, p. 222) explicitly denies substantive correlativity
(I have not taken over Simmonds’ terminology for reasons that would take too much space to explain).
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Insensitivity
The insensitivity-charge holds that government officials should not have the
freedom to waive the duties, say, of doctors to the unempowerable, but that Will
Theory cannot but grant them that freedom. Why should that be so? Three claims
seem to be working together to produce the conclusion that the Will Theory must
grant government officials the freedom to waive the duties of doctors. These are (1)
that duties are correlative to rights; (2) that the rights correlative to the duties of
doctors are to be located in government officials, and (3) that having a right (a
power) is inconsistent with being under a duty to exercise it.
I have deliberately formulated the first claim rather vaguely, because I am not
convinced that Steiner really endorses the claim that all duties are correlative to
rights. He certainly holds that criminal law duties are correlative to rights of
government officials, and he also applies the reasoning by which he arrives at this
conclusion to the duties regarding the unempowerable (claim #2). It should be
obvious that the first claim is not necessarily part of any version of Will Theory.
Neither is the second, for that matter. As far as I can see, there is nothing
inconsistent about endorsing the Will Theory of rights while holding that some legal
duties are not correlative to rights. This is the most obvious reason why the
insensitivity critique does not apply to Will Theory per se.
There’s more. We could ask whether the insensitivity critique applies even to
Steiner’s version. It certainly would if we accept all of Steiner’s claims.
Unfortunately, Steiner’s defence of the Will Theory is not nearly as rigorous as
Vrousalis takes it to be, and this also undermines the latter’s challenge. In particular,
two of Steiner’s analytical claims which are central to the challenge are in fact badly
mistaken, and a third one is at the very least highly contentious.
To see how these mistakes affect Vrasoulias’s critique, consider first a claim
which Vrasoulias explicitly endorses—that having a power is inconsistent with
having a duty to exercise it (that is the third claim on which the insensitivity critique
rests). According to Steiner, a set of legal rules cannot grant me a power to waive a
duty and a power to demand you to comply with your duty, while at the same time
requiring me to waive your duty. In such a situation, he argues, one and the same set
of rules thus would appear to vest me with the power (to demand compliance) and to
disable me from exercising it (Steiner 1998, p. 243).
Steiner’s claim is simply mistaken. Whenever I waive someone’s duty, I thereby
relinquish the right correlative to it, and thereby extinguish a power I previously had
(i.e. by exercising my power of waiver, I also extinguish the very power I
exercised). There is nothing in the logic of Hohfeld’s terminology that makes it
impossible for a set of legal rules to require me to exercise a power that I have. If
exercising this power also means extinguishing it (as in the case of waiving a duty)
then a rule system can oblige me to extinguish my own power (by exercising it). The
requirement that I extinguish this power does not mean that the power has already
ceased to exist. A forteriori, Steiner’s conclusion does not follow. Steiner wrote that
‘rejection of the suggestion that possession of powers implies the possession of
corresponding liberties entails a straightforward contradiction’ (Steiner 1998,
p. 243). But there is no such contradiction.
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Two examples may serve to illustrate this. Selling something is the exercise of a
power. Upon the conclusion of a sale, the new owner will have acquired certain
rights, whereas the previous owner will have lost some.4 If Steiner is correct, the
power to sell something implies a corresponding set of liberties to sell or not to sell
the item. To think that someone might have a power to sell something and at the
same time be prohibited from selling it would then be a conceptual mistake. But it is
not. Like many other jurisdictions, Belgium prohibits the sale of cigarettes to
minors. If a shop keeper ignores such a prohibition and sells a package of cigarettes
to a 17 year old adolescent, he incurs a liability to be punished for doing something
that he ought not to have done (selling the cigarettes). The sale, however, is
considered to be valid. In other words, the shop keeper is liable to punishment
because he exercised a power that he was not at liberty to exercise. It is simply
mistaken to think that the prohibition to sell the package of cigarettes entails that
there has been no sale. To avoid misunderstanding, I am not denying that any legal
system might simply declare void any attempt to sell cigarettes to a minor. In that
case, the shop owner might still be punished for handing over cigarettes to the 17
year old, but he would not—strictly speaking—be punishable for the sale of the
cigarettes, because the minor never acquired legal ownership of them. What
concerns us here, however, is the fact that it is perfectly well conceivable that a law
does consider the sale as valid, and considers the shopkeeper as having committed
an offence by exercising a power which he was not at liberty to exercise. The fact
that it was illicit for him to do so does not mean he was unable to do it. Steiner’s
claim that normative ability implies permissibility must be rejected as a
concatenation of two perfectly distinct ideas—as confounding deontic and alethic
modal categories (for the distinction, see Sumner 1987, pp. 22–23).
Another example may serve to further illustrate the relevant distinction. Public
officers often have a duty to exercise powers. The fact that they have a duty to exercise
these powers does not mean, however, that the powers are activated independently of
the actual decision of the official. A dramatic example of this was the crisis following
the refusal of the Belgian King Baudouin to sign a law legalizing abortion (under
certain circumstances). The law had been approved in Parliament and consequently
the King had a duty to sign it. Nevertheless, the law would only take effect upon the
King’s approval. This created a rather uncommon situation: usually when the law
requires us to do something it also foresees punishment in case of non-compliance, but
in this case there was no way to punish the King for not fulfilling his duty. In the end
he was declared unable to rule (for one day) so that the Government could endorse
the law. Again, this case illustrates the distinctness of powers from normative
requirements: the King’s ability to change the normative positions of Belgians was not
inconsistent with a requirement to use his power in a certain way.
The upshot of this is that Steiner was wrong in claiming that having a power is
inconsistent with being under a duty to exercise it. A public official may well both
have a power over a doctor’s duty of care and be under a duty not to waive the
doctor’s duty. Hence the insensitivity critique is mistaken: it would have an object
4 A sale could be construed as involving the exercise of several powers (of buyer and seller) at different
times, but these complications can be ignored for the present purpose.
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only if Steiner’s claims regarding Hoheld’s logic were tenable. Since they are not,
Will Theory need not deny that government officials who exercise powers can have
duties of care. This dissolves the first horn of the supposed dilemma, and it suffices
to conclude that there is no dilemma. In the next Section, I will show that the second
horn of the supposed dilemma—the claim that Will Theory is incomplete if it
accepts that legal officials’ discretion over powers is restricted by duties of care—is
unfounded as well.
Incompleteness
The traditional incompleteness charge holds that Will Theory cannot account for
many (too many) of the instances in which we take people to have rights. For
example, Will Theory seems committed to denying rights to certain beings, such as
children and mentally handicapped (Steiner 1998, p. 259, but see Simmonds 1998,
p. 226 n. 138). Several Will Theorists have shown themselves susceptible to this
critique. It may, for example, explain why Herbert Hart, in his discussion of legal
rights, stepped back from his early stance that the notion of rights should not be
extended to children (as suggested by Kramer 1998, pp. 69–70; compare Hart 1955,
p. 181 with 1982, p. 184 n. 86).
The traditional incompleteness charge depends on the assumption that a theory of
rights should aim to accommodate most of our ordinary judgments on the subject.
This seems perfectly reasonable—provided we interpret the class of judgments
broadly so that it encompasses accepted jurisprudential practices, rules, etc. What
other yardstick could we use to test theories of the nature of rights? The crucial
point, however, is indeed that the relevant class of judgments is broader than our
intuitions regarding which normative incidents count as genuine ‘rights’. Other
measures may be the extent to which the theory conforms to common ideas
regarding the way rights function in legal systems or moral theories; whether it
captures the features that we ordinarily think of as characteristic of rights—such as
peremptoriness or enforceability; whether it fits our ideas as to which beings can
bear rights; or perhaps even our judgments regarding what rights are supposed to do
for us (e.g. to protect interests or to enable us to control duties owed to us).
Thus we need not deny the importance of extensional adequacy as a criterion to
determine the success of a theory of the nature of rights in order to appreciate why
Herbert Hart may have been unimpressed with the charge of incompleteness. He
plainly recognized that his analysis did not cover all normative incidences that we
ordinarily refer to using the word ‘right’. Nonetheless he felt that his theory laid
bare important aspects of the concept of a right that Bentham’s competing analysis
had left out. If Hart was right about this, the Will Theory might still be the best
available theory, despite the fact that it is more vulnerable to the charge of
extensional inadequacy than Interest Theory.
The incompleteness charge as Vrousalis advances it against Steiner’s version of
Will Theory is slightly different from the traditional complaint. The concern here is
not with instances where we would ordinarily recognize a right which the theory
fails to account for; rather it is with duties for which the theory may not be able to
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find a corresponding right. Vrousalis takes the position that no theory should leave
the unempowerable at the mercy of some government official. He then castigates
Will Theory for not having the conceptual resources to ascribe or justify the duties
that he thinks officials should have.5 This is a strange claim, since neither Will
Theory nor Interest Theory aspire to justify duties. They are attempts at conceptual
analysis, not normative theories. Their aim is not to provide reasons for holding
people under a duty, but to clarify the nature of rights.6 Nor does Vrousalis give us
any argument as to why we should expect Will Theory to do what it didn’t set out to
do. In other words, the charge that Will Theory cannot justify the duty of a
government official is a red herring.7
Putting the issue of justification aside, I suggest we can try to make sense of the
claim that Will Theory is ‘not conceptually self-subsistent’ as follows: Vrousalis
holds that most Will Theorists accept the correlativity axiom, which means that they
think of duties as correlative to rights. Accordingly, if a doctor has a duty to treat the
unempowerable, the Will Theorist must take someone to have a right correlative to
this duty. Obviously, Will Theory cannot identify the unempowerable as holding the
right, therefore it must find another right holder. Since Steiner identifies government
officials as holders of rights correlative to criminal law duties it seems logical to
assume he would follow the same route in the case of rights correlative to the
doctor’s duties. Steiner’s ground for assigning rights correlative to criminal law
duties to government officials, however, is his claim that for each criminal law duty
there is (must be!) some government official who has the power to waive it. Hence if
we assume that some government official has a right correlative to the doctor’s duty,
this official must also have a power to waive this duty. This government official is
ex hypothesi also under a duty not to exercise the power he has. But according to
Steiner having a power is incoherent with being under a duty not to exercise it.
Thus, if we accept Steiner’s claim, we must acknowledge that the higher official
doesn’t have a power over the doctor’s duty after all. And if the official does not
have this power, then—according to Will Theory—he has no right against the
doctor. If we assume that the government official’s duty is correlative to a right of
some higher official, we end up with the same dilemma at this higher level, and so
forth. And now we end up unable to account for both the doctor’s duty and the
government official’s duty as well, since we started out with the assumption that any
duty is correlative to a right.
Clearly this is an inconsistent set of claims. Are Will Theorists committed to it if
they accept that some government official has a duty of care with regard to the
unempowerable? They certainly need not be committed to Steiner’s claim (which
we rejected earlier) that no-one can have a power and be under a duty to exercise it.
Still, the recognition that government officials can have a duty to exercise a power
doesn’t resolve the issue of incompleteness, as Vrousalis sees it, since it is not clear
5 For if a will theorist were to argue, say, that M’s crucial interests are at stake, and that is what grounds
the official’s duty, then he would be appealing to extra-will-theory considerations to defend himself.
Indeed, he would be calling upon his perennial enemy, the interest theorist, to do so.
6 Many thanks to an excellent referee for pointing this out.
7 To be sure, Steiner’s project in his Essay on Rights is not merely analytical, but this project has failed.
See Simmonds (1995).
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whether anyone holds a right correlative to the government official’s duty of care.
It seems Will Theorists either need to abandon the correlativity axiom, or show
that someone has a right correlative to this duty. Both options are actually open to
the Will Theorist.
Rejecting the correlativity axiom is the obvious way to escape incompleteness as
defined by Vrousalis. Certainly when it is taken to apply to moral as well as legal
duties and rights, the axiom is by no means intuitively compelling. We have may
have duties not to abuse animals even if we don’t think of animals as rights bearers;
or we may have imperfect duties—duties that are not directed to anyone in
particular, such as the duty to give alms. These duties do not seem correlative to any
right and it would require a strong argument to establish that our impression that
they are not is in fact mistaken. Though it may not be so obvious, I believe this is
also true in the realm of legal rights and duties. My legal duty not to trespass on your
property seems correlative to your right that I do not trespass, but other legal
duties—such as my duty to wear a helmet when driving a motorcycle or a minor’s
duty not to drink—are not obviously correlative to anyone’s right. We may say that
some duties are ‘owed’ to a particular individual whereas others are not, or we may
say that some duties are directed and some are not. Whether in the end we wish to
uphold this distinction between directed and undirected duties remains to be seen,
but it is certainly not counter-intuitive. Since not all Will Theorists have accepted
the correlativity axiom, and since Vrousalis hasn’t given us any reason to think
that they ought to accept it, we can conclude that Will Theory need not respond to
any charge of incompleteness. Will Theory does not and need not claim the
completeness which Vrousalis says it lacks. In the absence of an argument that casts
doubt on the tenability of the distinction between directed and undirected duties, it is
simply unwaranted to require of any analysis of rights that it should be ‘complete’ in
the sense that it assigns a right holder whenever there is a duty.
This effectively eliminates the other horn of the supposed dilemma as well. Any
real dilemma has two horns, but in this case we have none.
Even if Will Theory can do without the correlativity axiom, could we nevertheless
agree with Vrousalis that Will Theory must be incomplete unless it abandons the
correlativity axiom? Unfortunately we cannot. The problem that Vrousalis points to is
specific to Steiner’s version and, moreover, it rests on a claim that is again manifestly
flawed—i.e. the argument that any criminal law duty must be correlative to some right
vested in a state official. Vrousalis does not explicitly endorse the claim. In fact, in a
footnote he mentions that it may strike many as highly contentious (Vrousali 2010,
p. 418 n. 7). Yet for the sake of his challenge to the Will Theory, he continues to rely on
it. When the fallacy is clarified, however, it is easy to see that Steiner’s fallacious
inferences cannot be taken as a ground to criticize Will Theory.
Steiner argued that every criminal law duty correlates with a legal right of a
government official. He adduced criminal law practices such as plea-bargaining and
the granting of clemency to show that state officials sometimes have powers over
our criminal law duties. An obvious objection is that though state officials may have
powers over some criminal law duties, constitutional provisions deny them similar
powers over other legal duties. Steiner thinks, however, that the logic of Hohfeld’s
scheme forces us to acknowledge that for every legal duty there must be a
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government official who has relevant powers over it. The argument goes like this:
Imagine that some government official is not able to waive compliance with the
criminal law. Translated into Hohfeldian terminology, this official has a disability to
waive compliance. Since disabilities are correlative to immunities, we must find
someone to bear the correlative immunity. Steiner thinks this someone must be
a higher official. He then asks whether we could imagine this higher official to be
able to waive his own immunity (which would amount to granting a power to the
lower official). If this higher official has a disability to waive his own immunity
some even higher official, according to Steiner, must have an immunity correlative
to that disability, and so on. A possible infinite regress can only be stopped, again
according to Steiner, by positing an immunity that is waivable. Hence, ‘unwaivable
immunities (eventually!) entail waivable ones’ (Steiner 1998, p. 254). But the
argument is flawed: the threat of an infinite regress is a product of Steiner’s
imagination, not of Hohfeldian logic. The disability of any government official to
waive criminal law duties is correlative to immunities of the citizens who bear those
duties, not immunities held by higher government officials. This flaw has already
been revealed by Nigel Simmonds (1995, pp. 317-20) in a detailed refutation of the
central argument of Steiner’s Essay on Rights.8 We also do not need to assume—as
Steiner does in his response in (Steiner 1998, p. 254, n. 32)—that the immunity
correlative to the citizen’s disability to waive her own immunity is located in this
government official. We can locate it in the lawgiver. Moreover, even if Steiner had
been correct in thinking that the immunity correlative the official’s disability to
waive criminal law duties is located in the higher official, his conclusion would still
not follow. The disability of this higher official to waive the immunity would
correlate with immunities located in both officials, not in some even higher official.
The upshot of this is that there is simply no basis for the claim that some
government official must have a power correlative to the doctor’s duty of care, nor
that some higher official must have a power over a lower official’s duty.
This critique of Steiner’s claims might seem to strengthen Vrousalis’s challenge
rather than undermine it, for if there is no government official who exercises a
power over the doctor’s duty Will Theory would seem to be unable to account for
that duty (since we are considering versions of the Will Theory that take duties to
correlate with rights). Alternatively, if some government official does exercise
control over the doctor’s duty, this official must have duty of care (since we are
assuming that no government official should be in a position of unrestricted
discretion over the doctor’s duty) and the Will Theory would again seem unable to
account for this duty. It would indeed be unable to do so if it were bound to locate
the holder of a right correlative to these duties either among ordinary civilians or in
the government hierarchy. Some of our duties are simply not controlled by either.
But we can locate the holder of correlative rights in the lawgiver. After all, Will
Theory holds that a duty is owed to the agent who has a power over it, and
legislation is the exercise of a (Hohfeldian) power. Moreover, most of the legal
duties that we have continue to exist only as long as the legislative power doesn’t
8 Steiner recognizes this in a footnote in A debate over rights (254, n. 32). His response is, however,
problematic for several reasons, but it would lead us too far to explain these in detail.
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choose to eradicate them. Paul Graham (1996) has gone further in locating the rights
correlative to legal duties outside the legal system, in the people that has established
the jurisdiction.9 Whatever your judgment on the overall desirability of this move,
there is nothing logically incoherent about it. So again we can conclude that Will
Theory is not incomplete, even if a Will Theorist decides to accept the correlativity
axiom.
Incompleteness Again
Vrousalis acknowledges that Will Theory allows for the existence of legal duties
that are not correlative to rights, but complains that there is nothing within the
conceptual apparatus of Will Theory that justifies ascription of duties of care to
the unempowerable. As I argued above, this is to demand something of a theory of
the nature of rights that it was simply not designed to do (and doesn’t need to do).
Yet perhaps there is a more profound complaint here. Steiner has characterized
rights as ‘essentially about who is owed what by whom’ (Steiner 2006, p. 459). So if
it follows from Will Theory that the unempowerable do not have rights, then our
duties are perhaps not owed to them: rather they are simply duties regarding them,
much like we may think of our duties not to mistreat animals as duties regarding
them, but not owed to them. This way of looking at our duties to the unempowerable
can’t be right, according to Vrousalis: ‘A duty to care for M … must emanate in
some way from him, or from his status as a human being, and is not, therefore, ‘non-
directed’ as the will theorist must insist here’ (Vrousalis 2010, p. 421).
As it is formulated here, however, the complaint is either too vague or too
specific. The demand that a duty of care for M must emanate in some way from him
in effect smuggles in an assumption of Interest Theory—that duties correlative to
rights must in some appropriate way be grounded in an interest of the beneficiary.10
Why should it be an embarrassment to Will Theory that it doesn’t consider our duty
to the unempowerable as owed to them? One of the main advantages of Will
Theory, it could be claimed, is that (unlike Interest Theory) it gives us a clear-cut
distinction between duties which are directed and those which are not directed to
fellow citizens. Nor is there any reason to think that these duties are any less legal
duties, or that they must have less force than duties which do correlate with rights of
individual citizens. By comparison, consider that the mere fact that Will Theory
regards criminal law duties as not correlative to rights of citizens does not prevent
these duties from having the status of legal duties with equal force as civil law
duties.
Alternatively, the demand that our duty to M must emanate from M’s status as a
human being begs the question. Why should the line be drawn between human and
non-human beings? Why not draw the line between agents and non-agents, as surely
both the law and our intuitions make a significant distinction between agents and
non-agents? Or between animals and inanimate beings, since it doesn’t sound
9 See my (2012) for discussion of this suggestion.
10 This is a very ‘loose’ formulation, to be sure, but it will do for the present purpose.
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completely off the mark to say that we have duties to them (not to treat them
cruelly), whereas it would sound outrageous to say that a duty not to walk on the
grass is owed to the grass?
Vrousalis’s final charge is both imprecise and insufficiently argued. But there’s a
more important lesson to be drawn. A decision where to draw the line between
directed and undirected duties cannot be based on an isolated appeal to pre-
theoretical intuitions. The reason is simply that some of our intuitions are too vague.
Hence, no refutation of a theory of the nature of rights can rest on the indictment
that it mismatches our intuitive judgment in any single case. The more sensible
approach is to weigh the amount of overall ‘intuitive fit’ of different theories.
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